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SPRING 1983
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE
LAW REVIEW
CONSTITUTIONAL AND PRACTICAL PROBLEMS IN LEGIS-
LATION TO TERMINATE NON-PRODUCTIVE MINERAL IN-
TERESTS
Shirley Norwood Jones*
I. THE PROBLEM
A problem that has been receiving increasing attention in re-
cent years, not only in Mississippi but in a number of other states,
is determining a proper means of eliminating severed mineral in-
terests of long standing. The problem arises in part because of
the difficulty in locating persons who own no interest in the sur-
face and whose interest in the minerals may be very small. The
mineral severance may arise either because the grantor reserved
the minerals when the surface was sold or because only the mineral
interest was conveyed. Where the conveyance was on minerals
alone, there are often numerous mineral conveyances, sometimes
with each conveying a smaller interest than the one before.
Anyone who has done much title work has discovered that
it is indeed a rare title which has a completely unbroken line of
conveyances from the original patent to the present time. If a title
search is to go back to the patent and include all instruments and
other pertinent data from the patent to the search date, obviously
the work involved in certifying a title becomes greater every year
as more and more conveyances appear of record. The factor that
has most helped the ordinary real estate search is the usual recogni-
tion of adverse possession.1 The minimum period of a title search
in Mississippi is usually considered to be thirty-one years, being
the ten year period of adverse possession plus a twenty-one year
period to cover the minority of an owner' although, depending
on the purpose of the search, a search covering fifty or sixty years
*Professor of Law, Mississippi College. B.A. 1950, J.D. 1952, University of Mississippi School
of Law.
1. See McCaughn v. Young, 85 Miss. 277, 37 So. 839 (1905). The essential, generally recogniz-
ed elements of adverse possession are set out: "The occupancy must be hostile, actual, open and
notorious, exclusive, and continuous for the statutory period."
2. MIss. CODE ANN. § 15-1-13 (1972).
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is often made.'
An abbreviated title search will not suffice where severed
minerals are involved. In most jurisdictions, including Mississip-
pi, it is well established that adverse possession of the surface of
the land does not enure to the benefit of one claiming the minerals
where there has been a severance of the minerals prior to the begin-
ning of the adverse possession.' The Mississippi case of Huddleston
v. Peel set out this well-recognized rule, stating "after title to the
surface estate has been severed from title to the underlying mineral
estate, title to the minerals cannot be acquired by adverse posses-
sion of the surface.alone."5 It is because of this limitation on adverse
possession that other remedies have been sought to terminate
mineral interests. Practically all jurisdictions recognize that severed
minerals can be adversely possessed only through actual drilling
or at least by some type of operation for the production of minerals.
The Mississippi Supreme Court pointed out that this seems to be
the universal rule as well as the rule adhered to by our court.'
On the other hand, the adverse possession, once begun, will con-
tinue to run even after a severance takes place.7
II. Texaco, Inc. v. Short
Legislation dealing with severed minerals is variously found
under the title of "Dormant Mineral Acts" or "Mineral Lapse Acts"
and sometimes "Marketable Title Acts." Questions relating to the
legality of this type of legislation were answered in part by the
United States Supreme Court in January of 1982 with its decision
in the case of Texaco, Inc. v. Short.8 In this case the United States
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of an Indiana statute
which provided that a severed mineral interest which was not
used for a period of twenty years would revert to the estate out
of which it was carved unless the mineral owner filed a statement
of claim in the local county recorder's office. The statute also pro-
vided for a two-year grace period during which the owners of such
mineral interest could file their statements of claim. 9
3. E.g., the time required for certificate for owner Title Insurance Policies varies from 50
to 60 years.
4. 1 WILLIAMS AND MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 224.1 (1981).
5. 238 Miss. 798, 802, 119 So. 2d 921, 923 (1960), suggestion of error overruled, 238 Miss.
798, 120 So. 2d 776 (1960).
6. 238 Miss. at 802, 119 So. 2d at 923. See also Cook v. Farley, 195 Miss. 638, 15 So.
2d 352 (1943); White v. Merchants & Planters Bank, 229 Miss. 35, 90 So. 2d 11 (1956).
7. 238 Miss. at 802, 119 So. 2d at 923.
8. 454 U. S. 516 (1982).
9. Id. at 518.
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Most of the discussions concerning the statute in Indiana, in-
cluding that of the United States Supreme Court in Texaco, Inc.
v. Short, seem to assume that the minerals would, under the statute,
go back to the owner of the surface. The statute in fact provided
that the unused interest should be "extinguished" and that "owner-
ship shall revert to the then owner of the interest out of which it
was carved."1 While the Indiana Supreme Court stated, "the act
removes this impediment [the severed mineral interest] by return-
ing the severed mineral estate to the surface rights owner"' this
in fact was not the language of the statute although it was the in-
cidental effect in Texaco, Inc. v. Short. In spite of assumptions
to the contrary in cases not dealing with the subject, statutes such
as that in Indiana would return the interest to the surface owner
only where there was not an intervening conveyance.
In many instances where minerals have been sold, there have
been a number of different mineral conveyances. For example,
Smith might convey a one-half interest in the oil, gas and minerals
under Blackacre to Brown. Brown might then convey a one-quarter
interest in the minerals (half of his half) to Green. If Green fails,
under legislation such as that in Indiana, to register his minerals
or to explore for production, his one-quarter interest would not
revert to Smith, the surface owner, but rather would revert to the
immediately preceding mineral owner, Brown. The statutes do
not deal with just when Brown would have to file to preserve the
minerals he received by reverter; presumably he would have
twenty years from the date they reverted to him. Of course, Brown
would have to file within the first twenty-year period to preserve
the one-fourth interest never conveyed to Green. The Indiana-
type statute does not appear to contemplate the problem, but
presumably anyone owning severed minerals would have to file
every twenty years in order to preserve each interest which he
acquired whether through lapse or reverter or by purchase.
Unfortunately little effort seems to have been expended on the
many problems of interpretation which will eventually develop
under these statutes.
There are three prime questions which were considered in
Texaco, Inc. v. Short, and which tend to come up in most of the
cases dealing with these statutes. These questions are:
(1) Whether the lack of prior notice of the lapse deprived
the former owner of the minerals of his property without
10. Id.
11. Short v. Texaco, Inc., 406 N.E. 2d 625, 627 (Ind. 1980).
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due process of law in violation of the fourteenth amend-
ment to the United States Constitution.
(2) Whether such a statute effects a taking of private prop-
erty without just compensation in violation of the con-
tract clause of the United States Constitution; and,
(3) Whether exceptions for owners with a large number of
minerals would invalidate the entire statute as depriving
the smaller owners of equal protection of the law in viola-
tion of the United States Constitution.
In Texaco, Inc. v. Short, the United States Supreme Court held
that the Indiana statute did not violate any of these provisions of
the United States Constitution. There was a dissent by four
justices12 who felt that some form of pre-extinguishment notice
was necessary to meet consitutional guarantees. The Indiana statute
in question did not require that any pre-lapse notice be given."3
Neither was there any indication in Texaco, Inc. v. Short that the
party losing his minerals had any actual notice that the statute had
been enacted. The majority did not require notice in advance of
the forfeiture of the mineral interest as would be required in a
judicial proceeding because the statute was found to be more in
the nature of a statute of limitations. The Court concluded that
appellants may be presumed to have notice.' Apparently this is
a conclusive presumption.
The Indiana Supreme Court found that the Mineral Lapse Act
was a permissible exercise of police power. It was conceded by
the United States Supreme Court that in Indiana (as in Mississip-
pi) "s a severed mineral interest was a "vested property interest." 16
The United States Supreme Court recognized 7 that it had, since
early times, permitted unused or abandoned interests in property
to revert. An argument recognized in the early cases was that the
statutory "extinguishment" could properly be viewed as the
withdrawal of a remedy rather than the destruction of a right.18
In answer to the argument that the Mineral Lapse Act took
private property without just compensation in violation of the four-
teenth amendment, the Supreme Court responded that the state
does not need to compensate the owner for the consequences of
12. The dissenters were Justices Brennan, White, Marshall and Powell.
13. Texaco, Inc., 454 U.S. at 520.
14. Id. at 533.
15. See Merrill Engineering Co. v. Capital National Bank, 192 Miss. 378, 5 So. 2d 666 (1942).
16. Texaco, Inc., 454 U.S. at 525.
17. Id. at 526 (citing Hawkins v. Barney's Lessee, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 457 (1831)).
18. Texaco, Inc., 454 U.S. at 528.
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his own neglect. 9 The Court concluded that the state may treat
a mineral interest, not used for twenty years, as abandoned and
that after abandonment the former owner retains no interest. Since
it was the abandonment that caused the loss of interest and not
a taking by the state, there was no cause for compensation. The
Supreme Court also held that the two-year grace period was ade-
quate against an argument that the statute was invalid because
retroactive.
The vigorous dissent in Texaco, Inc. v. Short found the prin-
cipal question to be whether the state of Indiana had deprived the
appellants of due process by extinguishing their pre-existing prop-
erty interests without regard to whether or not they knew of the
existence of the requirement for filing. "° The dissent stated that
the statute requires the filing of a claim every twenty years." In
fact, the statute did not deal with refilings but presumably this
was the intent of the legislation.
One serious problem of concern to the dissenters was the
retroactive effect of the statute with no requirement of any specific
notice to people with pre-existing property interests. The posi-
tion of the dissent was that property owners should be able to rest
easy in the knowledge that their property is secure and not have
to watch the statutory enactments of the legislature in order to
keep from losing their property. The dissenters found no affir-
mative state interest justifying a failure to provide pre-
extinguishment notice. 2 In fact, under the Indiana statute a pre-
extinguishment notice was necessary if the person in question own-
ed ten or more mineral interests in the county and made a good-
faith effort to register them.23 The question arises of why legisla-
tion should be designed to protect large landowners while ignor-
ing the small owner who is probably much more likely to be
unaware of the legislation. It was the opinion of the dissenters
that the statute in question violated the due process clause of the
U.S. Constitution.'
One of the serious practical problems involved in legislation
such as the Indiana statute is that if an exception is to be made
for property owners holding ten or more pieces of property in
a county, it is a practical impossibility to determine in a given
19. Id. at 530.
20. Id. at 540 (Brennan J., dissenting).
21. Id. at 541.
22. Id. at 522.
23. Id. at 520.
24. Id. at 554.
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case whether the property right has been forfeited or not. Cer-
tainly one could not check every title in the county!
III. ABANDONMENT OF MINERALS
A fundamental problem to be dealt with when legislation to
terminate mineral interests is considered in a state which
recognizes the ownership of minerals as an interest in real prop-
erty is the common law rule that real property cannot be aban-
doned. Mississippi takes the position that until brought to the sur-
face and reduced to possession, oil or gas constitutes an interest
in real estate and not personal property.2" Many of the statutes
either assume an abandonment or in fact treat the property as be-
ing abandoned in order to justify transferring it from one to another
without compensation. "6 The majority opinion in Texaco, Inc. v.
Short took the position that unused minerals could be abandoned
but commented that if any taxes were paid on the severed minerals
they would not be abandoned.27 Neither the Indiana Court nor the
U. S. Supreme Court indicated what, if any, type of tax could
be paid on severed minerals in Indiana to keep them from being
abandoned.
There are several theories of ownership which are important
in the law of oil and gas.28 When a person owns land in fee sim-
ple, he not only owns the surface but the minerals as well. The
same problems are not encountered in fee simple ownership that
are encountered when the surface has been conveyed or reserved
apart from the minerals. In fact, probably no one would deny that
the existence of separate mineral titles complicates title
examinations.
At the start we must distinguish legislation in the civil law
jurisdiction of Louisiana in which oil and gas, at least, have never
been recognized as being subject to ownership separate from the
surface but rather become a property interest only when removed
from the ground. There is an entirely different problem in Loui-
siana from the great majority of the other states in the union, most
of which, including Mississippi, 29 treat oil, gas and other minerals
as an interest in the real estate.
States that treat oil and gas as incorporeal hereditaments tend
to allow abandonment; while those treating oil and gas as cor-
25. Merrill Engineering Co., 192 Miss. at 382, 5 So. 2d at 670.
26. II AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 8.98 (1952).
27. Texaco, Inc., 454 U.S. at 529.
28. SIMES & TAYLOR, IMPROVEMENT OF CONVEYANCING BY LEGISLATION 239 (1960).
29. See Merrill Engineering Co., 192 Miss. at 382, 5 So. 2d at 670.
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poreal property tend to adhere to the common law rule that real
property cannot be abandoned. 0 The authorities on oil and gas
do not agree on whether a mineral interest is subject to abandon-
ment even in jurisdictions which consider such an interest an in-
corporeal hereditament.31 Williams and Myers state that if an in-
terest is incorporeal, it is subject to abandonment;3 2 yet Summers
believes that only Louisiana will recognize termination by
abandonment.3 ' The major case recognizing abandonment is that
of Gerhard v. Stephens from California.3 ' Another serious prob-
lem even in jurisdictions that recognize loss of a mineral interest
by abandonment is that no title can be cleared without litigation
even if subject to abandonment. Application of abandonment
would depend on a determination by a court that abandonment
had in fact occurred. It seems to be widely recognized that "[slome
method of terminating mineral interests after a period of inac-
tivity seems the best means of insuring marketability of mineral
interests." " Several remedies have been proposed in an effort
to reunite the surface with the mineral interest. The most com-
mon proposal is one designed to cause the minerals to revert to
the owner of the surface. Another proposal is to tax minerals which
are severed from the surface so that if a tax is not paid they could
be sold for taxes and perhaps reunited with the surface. This
remedy is, of course, totally unavailable unless there is a provi-
sion in the state law for the separate assessment of minerals. Fur-
thermore, just having such a statute certainly does not assure that
the minerals will be separately assessed,3" and if the sale goes to
someone other than the surface owner, nothing has really been
accomplished but to transfer the inactive mineral interests from
one separate mineral owner to another.
The big problem with taxing minerals that are severed from
the surface is the same problem that Mississippi faced prior to
the 1946 enactment of the mineral stamp tax on severed minerals
and the abolishment of the ad valorem tax on severed minerals.3 7
Mississippi had found that in most cases the revenue produced
30. Gerhard v. Stephens, 68 Cal. 2d 864, 442 P.2d 692, 69 Cal. Rptr. 612 (1968); see also
1 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, OIL AND GAS § 210.1 (1981).
31. Polston, Legislation, Existing and Proposed, Concerning Marketability of Ttles, VII LAND
& WATER L. REV. 73, 74 n.3 (1972).
32. 1 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 4, § 210.1, at 109.
33. IA W. SUMMERS, THE LAW OF OIL & GAS § 139, at 320 (1954).
34. 68 Cal.2d 864, 442 P.2d 692, 69 Cal. Rptr. 612 (1968).
35. Polston, supra note 31, at 75.
36. Id. at 76.
37. MISS CODE ANN. § 27-31-73 (1972).
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did not justify the labor involved in assessing and collecting the
tax. Most of the minerals were not being separately assessed and
those that were did not bring enough revenue to justify the tremen-
dous job of having all of these minerals properly assessed on the
tax roll. To eliminate this problem Chapter 409 of the Laws of
1946 was enacted, effective April 10, 1946.38 All nonproducing
leasehold interests upon oil, gas and other minerals created after
the effective date of the act and also non-producing interests in
oil, gas and minerals excepted by or reserved to the grantor
separately from the surface were exempted from ad valorem taxes
on or after January 1, 1947. The statute further provides that a
sale for taxes of the surface or the remainder of the fee shall not,
in any manner whatsoever, affect the interest exempted. Provi-
sion was also made for application for exemption and payment
of a stamp tax on minerals previously severed.3
The mineral documentary tax40 is levied on the filing and
recording of every lease or other writing conveying a separate
mineral estate whether the conveyance transfers the minerals or
reserves them. The tax is payable by the grantee of a lease or
mineral deed and by the grantor when minerals are reserved, 1
and the statute as it presently exists specifically exempts interests
passing by descent or will.4
2
Another solution that has been proposed is to prohibit separate
ownership in fee of the mineral interest. 3 This drastic solution
does not deal with the constitutional objections to the termination
of already existing separate mineral interests. Neither is it met with
enthusiasm by those owning separate minerals or by those not want-
ing to be deprived of the right to sell their minerals while retain-
ing the surface. This method seems to be a rather radical solution
to the entire problem. Should a man be deprived of his right to
sell part of his minerals? For example, while a well is being
drilled, often a partial mineral interest is sold. If the well turns
out to be a "dry hole"' the landowner has still realized something.
This realization would be lost if the minerals could not be sold
separately or else the landowner would have to sacrifice part of
his surface estate in order to realize anything from his minerals.
38. The tax on non-producing gas, oil and mineral interests is now found at Miss. CODE ANN.
§§ 27-31-71 to -87 (1972).
39. MISS COoE ANN. § 27-31-75 (1972).
40. Id. at § 27-31-77.
41. Id. at § 27-31-81.
42. Id.
43. Polston, supra note 31, at 77.
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Still another proposal sometimes advanced is to enact legisla-
tion allowing adverse possession of the minerals by the surface
owner without an ouster through the filing of an adverse claim.
One of the problems involved in this type of legislation is the type
of notice that should be given to the mineral owner. If adverse
possession begins to run merely by the filing of a claim, then every
ten years every owner of severed minerals would have to check
the records to be sure no adverse claim had been filed. On the
other hand, even if such legislation required notice sent to the last
known owner, what action must the owner take upon receipt of
the notice? Must he then drill within ten years? Suppose the drill-
ing results in a dry hole, does he lose his minerals or does he have
another ten years before adverse possession can run against him?
Would the legislation be constitutional as applied to present severed
minerals? To say the least, much litigation would result from such
legislation and with such legislation we would be without the
guidance of Texaco, Inc. v. Short.
A report of a special subcommittee of the Mississippi House
of Representatives concluded as follows:
It is the feeling of the committee that misunderstanding and misinformation have
led to a constant call for legislation which would return previously severed minerals
to the surface owners. It must be remembered that all severed mineral owners
have a valuable property right for which consideration was given. No one to the
committee's knowledge is recommending that property be taken from severed
mineral owners without just compensation. Everyone is in agreement that to take
this property right without notice to the agreement that to take this property right
without notice to the owner and a method to maintain the right by the owner
would be unconstitutional and unconscionable."
Any time that an owner, who could under present law retain
his property without drilling, is required to drill to keep from los-
ing his property, serious constitutional questions arise. Drilling
is a much more drastic requirement than the registration as upheld
in Texaco, Inc. v. Short and it can hardly be said that such a re-
quirement does not take away a valuable property right without
compensation.
IV. LOCAL INTEREST AND STATUTES
In Mississippi, the increasing interest in the return of severed
minerals to the surface owner has been primarily by landowners'
associations, who are, for the most part, seeking to get back
minerals which were sold by predecessors in title many years
44. Report of the Special Subcommittee on Severed Minerals to the Oil, Gas and Other Mineral
Committees of the Mississippi House of Representatives, Regular Session, 1978, at 13.
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before. The interest, of course, of the landowner is based on a
belief that such legislation would benefit him by having severed
minerals, not put into active production, returned to the owner
of the surface. At first appearance this might seem to be true but
it is also true that there are many acres in the state of Mississippi
owned by large timber companies in which the minerals have been
reserved by the former landowner. 5 Legislation designed for cut-
ting off severed minerals and returning them to the landowner
would, unfortunately, also cut off the reserved minerals and vest
the ownership in one who never paid for them."
One of the arguments frequently advanced to justify mineral
lapse acts or dormant mineral legislation is the problem which
prospective developers encounter in locating all of the persons own-
ing interests in the minerals. In some states the lack of a means
of locating these persons or of a means of proceeding without
locating them does give an oil and gas developer a serious prob-
lem. The problem arises because even with pooling statutes, one
who develops without obtaining leases from all mineral owners
must bear any loss from a dry hole without a corresponding in-
crease in interest in the event that a good well comes in. Mississippi
does not have the problem of locating the owners of mineral in-
terests to the same extent that many jurisdictions have because of
receivership statutes. 7 The receivership statutes were designed to
encourage exploration and development and provide that a per-
son claiming or owning any mineral interest in a tract of land upon
which mineral production is desired may file an affidavit in the
chancery court of the county in which the land is located and have
the chancery clerk appointed as receiver of the mineral interest
claimed or owned by a person whose whereabouts or identity is
unknown. Under this statute the receiver has the power and authori-
ty by court order to execute a lease, the terms of which shall be
at least as favorable to the absent person as other leases in the
same tract of land. 8 A statute also provides for the disposition
of the lease proceeds held by the receiver. 9
Mississippi's receivership statute has done much to eliminate
the practical problem concerning missing mineral interest owners.
In the absence of such a statute, when owners of an interest can-
not be located, the mineral interests are at best, assuming com-
45. Id. at 14.
46. Id.
47. MIss. CODE ANN. § 11-17-33 to -37 (1972).
48. Id. at § 11-17-33.
49. Id. at § 11-17-34.
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pulsory pooling, treated as unleased acreage with no contribution
to the cost of a dry hole though they would contribute to the cost
of the well should production come in.
Prior to the decision in Texaco, Inc. v. Short there had been
a number of statutes introduced in the Mississippi legislature. In
practically every session in recent years statutes have been intro-
duced containing some type of mineral reverter legislation. At least
partially because of the considerable doubt about the constitu-
tionality of such legislation, the bills invariably die in committee.
With the decision of the U. S. Supreme Court in Texaco, Inc. v.
Short there has been a renewed interest in this type of legislation
not only in the Mississippi legislature but elsewhere. At least thir-
teen separate bills were introduced in the 1983 regular session of
the Mississippi legislature. Some of these were statutes similar
to the Indiana act interpreted in Texaco, Inc. v. Short and others
were statutes designed to impose an ad valorem tax on severed
minerals.
The public benefit usually cited to justify mineral lapse-type
legislation is the promotion of exploration and development by
removing the problem of mineral owners who are either unknown
or cannot be located. Of course, the purpose must not be simply
to take one person's property and give it to another or the act would
be patently unconsitutional. In fact, in states upholding legisla-
tion, the tendency has been to find that there was no effective means
of dealing with unknown mineral owners other than some type
of lapse statute. As mentioned above, Mississippi does not have
this problem to the same extent as states without receivership
statutes. So
V. OTHER JURISDICrIONS
A number of other jurisdictions have enacted legislation
designed to remedy the severed mineral problem. Courts have not
been consistent in decisions regarding these statutes although, in
the majority of cases, the statutes have been upheld as not violative
of due process, equal protection or impairment of contract clauses
of state and federal constitutions."5
The Michigan Supreme Court upheld Michigan's Dormant
Mineral Act " as being within the police power of the state of
50. Id. at § 11-17-33 to -37.
51. See generally Annot., 16 A.L.R. 4th 1029, 103743 (1982).
52. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 554.291 (1967).
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Michigan in the case of Van Slooten v. Larsen.53 The Michigan
act provided that if the owner of severed oil and gas failed to take
actual possession or transfer by recorded instrument or record
notice for a period of twenty years, that the interest would be
deemed abandoned. The court held due process did not require
a hearing prior to vesting title in the owner of the surface estate;
nor did it unconstitutionally impair the obligation of contract. The
court further found the act did not create an evidentiary presump-
tion of abandonment but rather was designed to increase market-
ability by creating a rule of substantive law and further found that
there is a statutory presumption that due process is violated only
if there is no rational connection between the facts established and
the facts to be presumed.
In Chicago and Northwestern Transportation Co. v. Petersen"
the Wisconsin Supreme Court held the Wisconsin law unconstitu-
tional. The law in Wisconsin required a severed interest to be
registered within three years and thereafter a tax of fifteen cents
per acre had to be paid each year in order to maintain the severed
mineral interest."5 The trial court, affirmed by the Wisconsin
Supreme Court, found that the statute was unconstitutional as
violating the due process and equal protection clauses of the U.
S. Constitution. In finding that the statute was unconstitutional
because its enforcement provisions denied procedural and substan-
tive due process, the court recognized that mineral rights are an
interest in land. 6 The legislature could not take the property of
one and give it to another.
The Nebraska statute 7 was held unconstitutional insofar as
it applied retroactively in Wheelock v. Heath8 and in Monahan
Cattle Co. v. Goodwin,59 both of which were handed down by the
Nebraska Supreme Court on the same date. Both cases involved
retroactive application of the statute, and the statute in each case
was held to be unconstitutional only insofar as it purported to apply
to severed minerals existing prior to the enactment of the statute.
The Nebraska Supreme Court found that an intent to abandon was
necessary, recognizing that a severed mineral interest constitutes
an estate in fee simple in land or a corporeal hereditament. Both
cases held that statutory provisions which declared mineral rights
53. 410 Mich. 21, 299 N.W.2d 704 (1980), appeal dismissed, 455 U.S. 901 (1982).
54. 80 Wis. 2d 566, 259 N.W.2d 316 (1977).
55. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 700.30 (West 1981).
56. Chicago & N. W Transp. Co., 259 N.W.2d at 319.
57. NEB. REV. STAT. § 57-228-231 (1981).
58. 201 Neb. 835, 272 N.W.2d 768 (1978).
59. 201 Neb. 845, 272 N.W.2d 774 (1978).
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were abandoned unless the record owner had exercised owner-
ship within twenty-three years immediately prior to the action to
cancel the interest were unconstitutional as violative of both the
due process and contract clauses of the federal and state constitu-
tions insofar as they purported to operate retroactively.
The only savings clause that the statute in Nebraska had was
that if an action asserting an interest in severed minerals was filed
within two years, the owner of the severed mineral interest could
make his appearance and assert his interest therein and he would
then be deemed to have timely and publicly exercised his right
of ownership. In the Wheelock case, the court pointed out that in
effect the statute provided for a conclusive establishment of inten-
tion to abandon. 'At common law legal title to land could not be
lost by abandonment."7 ° Mineral interests are vested property rights
and are subject to the protection of the due process clause. The
court distinguished a mere possibility of reverter which could be
lost from an outright severance of the minerals."'
In the Illinois case of Wilson v. Bishop, 2 the Illinois court
also recognized that a severed mineral interest was a freehold
estate. 3 It was the opinion of the Illinois Court in this decision
prior to Texaco, Inc. v. Short that the U. S. Supreme Court re-
quired that due process at a minimum provided notice and an op-
portunity for a hearing. The Illinois case discussed the Indiana
state decision of Short v. Texaco, Inc. ,"4 but was unpersuaded by
the reasoning of the Indiana Supreme Court. Unfortunately for
those contending that the rule adopted in Illinois should be the
law, the subsequent U. S. Supreme Court decision in Texaco, Inc.
v. Short affirming the Indiana Supreme Court appears to have
established that where there is a reasonable savings clause that
legislation such as that enacted in Indiana would now be valid.
The Minnesota statute was dicussed in Contos v. Herbst.5 That
case found that the Mineral Registration Act was not itself un-
constitutional but that the procedure for forfeiting severed minerals
was unconstitutional. The court felt that notice prior to forfeiture
to the state should be required for procedural due process. Of
course, this case too was prior to Texaco, Inc. v. Short, but the
60. Wheelock, 272 N.W.2d at 771.
61. Id. at 773.
62. 82 Ill. 2d 364, 412 N.E.2d 522 (1980).
63. Id. at 524 (interpreting ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 30 § 197 (Smith-Hurd 1969)).
64. 406 N.E.2d 625 (Ind. 1980).
65. 278 N.W.2d 732 (Minn. 1979), appeal dismissed sub. noma., Prest v. Herbst, 444 U.S.
804 (1979).
66. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 93.52 to -.58 (West 1977).
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question was laid to rest in Minnesota when, subsequent to the
Herbst case, the Minnesota legislature amended the statute to deal
with the decision.67 As summarized in the note of decisions to the
amended code, the original Registration Act did not violate the
uniformity clause of the Minnesota Constitution, but procedures
attending forfeiture violated due process of both the state and federal
constitutions because the notice provisions were considered in-
adequate and because the owner of severed minerals who failed
to comply with registration was denied an opportunity for hear-
ing before forfeiture.
The Florida statute provided for the termination after twenty
years of easements and rights of entry which allowed access to
minerals.68 The Florida Supreme Court in Trustees of Tufts Col-
lege v. Triple R. Ranch, 9 held that the statute limiting to twenty-
year periods easements and rights reserved for the purpose of min-
ing, drilling, exploring or developing should not be applied retroac-
tively. The statute was subsequently amended specifically to pro-
vide for prospective as well as retrospective operation.7 ° The
preceding section provided for the extinguishment of such rights. 1
The statute enacted in South Dakota in 1976 and later
amended 2 provides for the filing of an affidavit which would bar
a severed mineral interest and also merge the severed interest with
the surface unless the person claiming the severed interest had
previously recorded an instrument describing the severed mineral
interest. The recording would be valid for ten years and could be
rerecorded. No case had reached the South Dakota Supreme Court
as late as 1982 when a comment on such a statute appeared in
the South Dakota Law Review. '
The Georgia statute, enacted in 1975 and amended, " provides
for presumptive adverse possession of mineral rights which had
not been worked nor taxed for a period of seven years. Subsequent
to the passage of that statute, the case of Nelson v. Bloodworth"'
67. Id. at § 93.55.
68. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 704.05 (West 1979).
69. 275 So. 2d 521 (Fla. 1973).
70. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 704.05 (West 1979).
71. Id. at § 712.04.
72. S.D. COMp. LAws ANN. § 43-30-8.1 (Supp. 1981).
73. Truhe, Surface Owner v. Mineral Owner or 'They can't do that, can they?"27 S.D.L. REV.
376, 416 (1982).
74. GA. CODE ANN. § 85-407.1 (1978).
75. 238 Ga. 264, 232 S.E.2d 547 (1977).
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was decided by the Georgia Supreme Court. The court avoided
a constitutional issue by holding that the statute did not begin to
run until July 1, 1975, so that there could be no cause of action
under the statute prior to seven years from that date.
The Virginia statutes 6 were held constitutional in Love v.
Lynchburg National Bank & Trust Co. " The Virginia statute pro-
vided that the owner of land subject to a claim could bring a suit
praying extinguishment of the claim and joining the claimant as
a defendant. 8 The suit must remain pending for at least six months
during which the defendant could explore for and discover com-
mercial minerals. The statute also provided for a prima facie
presumption that there were no commercial minerals after thirty-
five years. The problem with this approach is that litigation is re-
quired in each instance. 9 Furthermore, the Virginia statute has
strange geographical limitations so that Polston wonders how it
could have passed the test of constitutionality.80
It is not clear what effect the Virginia statute would have on
non-executive mineral interests8 since the Virginia statute con-
tains a prima facie determination of lack of minerals after thirty-
five years of inactivity and provisions for suit to be filed to quiet
title to the mineral interest. The mineral owner is then given six
months in which to explore for minerals, but suppose he has no
right to explore? Is he without a remedy? Certainly the effect of
such a statute on a non-participating royalty interest is not clear.
In North Carolina, where minerals have been severed from
the surface and not listed for ad valorem taxes for ten years prior
to January 1, 1965, and where the surface owner has an unbroken
chain of title to the surface for fifty years, he is deemed to have
a marketable title to the surfaces.82 The statute declares that severed
mineral interests recorded fifty years prior to September 1, 1965,
are null and void unless within two years after September 1, 1965,
a written notice is filed. The purpose is stated to facilitate land
title transactions by extinguishing ancient claims. The statute fur-
ther requires severed minerals to be listed for ad valorem taxes.
Publication of the taxing requirement was to be made. Later in
1981, effective June 30, 1982, additional statutes were passed up-
76. VA. CODE § 55-154 to-155 (1981).
77. 205 Va. 860, 140 S.E.2d 650 (1965).
78. VA. CODE § 55-154 (1981).
79. SIMES & TAYLOR, supra note 28, at 242.
80. Polston, supra note 31, at 81.
81. Id. at 89.
82. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-42.1 (1967).
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dating date requirements in various counties of North Carolina."
As of this writing, there is no decision of the North Carolina court
interpreting the statutes.
Some statutes apply only to oil and gas and leave solid minerals
unaffected and some deal only with solid minerals. Pennsylvania
enacted prospective legislation dealing with the surface in 1957.84
The legislation made a person liable who conveyed property with
outstanding coal rights or rights of surface support unless the in-
strument set forth in capital letters or distinctive type a prominent
notice. Of course, while this is helpful in giving notice of outstand-
ing solid minerals, it does little to help where the outstanding in-
terest is in oil and gas.85
The statute in Louisiana seems to be the source of most other
legislation.8" One of the big problems which has arisen is that of
finding the geographical limit of the interests upon which the doc-
trine of prescription will operate.87 Another question which fre-
quently arises in Louisiana and will certainly be likely to arise
elsewhere is that of what will interrupt prescription8 What par-
ticular tract will be included in that excepted from prescription
when there is exploration or oil production? Must it be minerals
under land included in the same deed? Must it be part of the same
section? Suppose a tract of one owner is unitized with a tract of
another and the drilling activities are only on the other owner's
property? Will this constitute use of the unitized tract on which
no drilling occurred? When we consider these questions, it is not
at all surprising that litigation in Louisiana has been voluminous.
The Louisiana statute differs from the statute in Indiana in
that in Indiana the geographical limitations which have plagued
the Louisiana courts have been eliminated by reference to the in-
strument in which the interest was created. The Indiana statute
also creates as many mineral interests as there are grantees in the
deed.
Polston takes the position that the phrase "out of which it was
carved" in the Indiana statute refers to the person who created the
mineral interest, recognizing that the terminating interest will
always operate in favor of the immediate subdivider "so long as
83. Id. at § 1-42.2-6 (Supp. 1981).
84. PA. STAT. ANN. § 1551-1554.
85. SIMEs & TAYLOR, supra note 28, at 243.
86. Polston, supra note 31, at 81.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 82. See also, 8 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, OIL & GAS LAw 565 (1982).
89. Id. at 93.
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his interest is being reserved.' " Polston believes that the ter-
minating interest would bypass the immediate subdivider if his
remaining interest is not being preserved. This should be the in-
terpretation finally put on this type of statute but this is one area
that should be clarified if the Indiana type statute is to be adopted.
Both interests could terminate simultaneously since a conveyance
would presumably not be a "we." At the instant of termination who
would be the "then owner of the interest out of which it [the mineral
interest] was carved"? There is nothing in the literal wording of
the statute to keep the owner of the preceding interest who
simultaneously lost his mineral interest under such a statute from
acquiring an interest which he had conveyed and which was also
allowed to terminate. Certainly, if the idea behind the statute is
elimination of miscellaneous unproductive mineral interest, by-
passing a lapsed interest would seem desirable.
VI. MARKETABLE TITLE ACTs
Another approach to the elimination of unused severed mineral
interests is through Marketable Title Acts. The Model Marketable
Title Act91 gives little relief to the problem under discussion because
the statute applies only to record titles and is designed to render
a record title marketable as against defects prior to the root of ti-
tle. While such a statute will probably eliminate some dormant
mineral interests, it does not eliminate "defects which are inherent
in the muniments out of which such chain of record title is
formed 792 Another problem with such a statute is that a conveyance
subject to outstanding minerals during the forty years (the sug-
gested period) will keep those interests from being cut off. It seems
that no matter what approach is adopted, the problems that arise
are considerable.
Professor Barnett 3 recognizes the various difficulties that arise
under the Marketable Title Acts. Among these are the possibility
that completely extraneous deeds, in the absence of possession,
could cut off a perfectly good prior recorded title as well as the
fact that a person acquiring a Marketable Title under such act need
not be a bona fide purchaser. Somehow it strikes many of us as
unjust, to say the least, if someone could acquire title to our prop-
erty (be it minerals or otherwise) simply by recording an extraneous
90. Id. at 94.
91. SIMES & TAYLOR, supra note 28, at 6; Polston, supra note 31, at 75.
92. Polston, supra note 31, at 75.
93. Barnett, Marketable Title Acts -Panacea or Pandemonium?, 53 CORNELL L. REV. 45 (1967).
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deed and keeping quiet for forty years. This supposed solution
really does not seem to eliminate any problem except that of giv-
ing lawyers assurance that they can ignore anything other than
recorded instruments. If the end to be sought is to have these con-
veyances apparent in the grantor-grantee indexes, even this is not
accomplished as "wild" instruments would never be found (except
by accident) if the search is being done by grantor-grantee index,
which is usually the only official index.
Before the Marketable Title Act, grantees from record owners
were certain that their interests were indefeasible provided that
they recorded their instruments. This is not true under Marketable
Title Acts.9' Of course the prime object and major advantage of
Marketable Title Acts is that they eliminate the problem of defects
in the pre-root chain of the person claiming record title.9" The
Marketable Title Act also may operate without litigation. Unfor-
tunately, as pointed out by Barnett, the interest of a person whose
name was forged may be cut off automatically without notice of
an adverse claim under such an act. 6 The real justification for
Marketable Title Acts seems to be that of simplifying title examina-
tion as well as reducing the amount of curative action needed in
order to obtain a good title.
97
Of course, most of the development in the oil and gas industry
takes place through a determinable interest-the oil and gas lease. 9'
Such an interest ordinarily does not run for a long period of time
and leases themselves do not usually create the principal title prob-
lems, even though problems can arise from leases which are not
cancelled of record as well as from conveyances. In some jurisdic-
tions statutes provide for notice to a lessee of a lease that has ter-
minated with penalty against a lessee who fails to release a lease
of record after notice.9 Affidavits of non-production are also often
used in lieu of releases. Fee interests cannot be disposed of quite
so easily.
VII. CONCLUSION
A brief review such as this does not pretend to be an exhaustive
survey of all legislation on the subject of dormant minerals, but
rather to show some of the types of statutes that have been enacted
94. Id. at 83.
95. Id. at 84-85.
96. Id. at 85.
97. Id. at 91.
98. Polston, supra note 31, at 78.
99. SIMES & TAYLOR, supra note 28, at 240; Miss. CODE ANN. § 89-5-23 (1972).
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in other jurisdictions, as well as to illustrate the different conclu-
sions regarding constitutionality of these statutes prior to Texaco,
Inc. v. Short. Even after Texaco, Inc. v. Short the question of con-
stitutionality of many of these statutes is not laid to rest. Small
variations in legislation and other laws of the particular state may
well cause a court in a given situation to reach a contrary result.
Unfortunately, if marketability is the purpose of mineral
legislation, many of the statutes leave titles worse off than they
were before the statutes were enacted. How, short of litigation,
would anyone ever know whether an interest had been forfeited
for lack of "use" where there was no filing? In fact this type of
legislation may well develop into another "lawyers' bill:" Litiga-
tion should be prodigious, especially where proof is required that
the owner not only had ten parcels (or some other number) in the
county but made a diligent effort to register all ten of them. Of
course, if title examiners are truly fortunate, they would not find
any effort made to register minerals so they would not have to worry
about diligent effort. X, who has no knowledge of a statute re-
quiring registration or who is confused on just when the twenty
years expires, clearly loses his minerals under most of these
statutes, but Y, who knows about the statute and about the time
registration is required, but who fails to register his mineral in-
terest in Blackacre, does not lose his interest if he registered
Greenacre and "made diligent effort" to register Blackacre, pro-
vided he could prove he had eight more parcels in the county,
whether he registered them or not, provided he made diligent ef-
fort on the other eight. Somehow the justice of this type of legisla-
tion escapes the writer.
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